In dispute over renewable fuels, justices unravel “extensions” of “exemptions”

When Congress states that a agency can apply for an “extension” of an exemption, is a agency that has authorized its exemption to lapse eligible to apply for the “extension?” That is the issue that divided the Supreme Courtroom justices Friday in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining v. Renewable Fuels Affiliation. Six justices stated certainly, while 3 justices stated no.

The context in which the issue arose was the Renewable Fuels Method that Congress set up in 2005. The software is meant to enhance the use of renewable fuels this sort of as ethanol. To even further that objective, the statute essential refiners to mix renewable fuels with the crude oil they refine. The percent of renewable fuels that refineries will have to mix raises each yr.

Congress was anxious that the mixing need may well have disproportionate adverse consequences on tiny refiners, so it bundled a statutory exemption applicable to tiny refiners that lasted till 2011. It also instructed the Office of Strength to research no matter if the mixing need had a disproportionate adverse effect on tiny refiners. If the department found a disproportionate adverse effect, the statute directed the Environmental Defense Company to contemplate applications from particular person tiny refiners to lengthen the exemptions for as extensive as two years at a time. The department did obtain a disproportionate adverse effect, and the EPA commenced to contemplate no matter if to grant extensions to tiny refiners who utilized for them.

This case involved 3 tiny refiners that had received exemptions in the past but had authorized them to lapse. Each refiner utilized for and was granted an “extension” of its exemption. The Renewable Fuels Affiliation challenged the validity of the EPA decisions to grant the extensions based mostly on its claim that the 3 refiners have been not eligible to apply for the extensions. The RFA argued that “extension” refers only to a refiner that has continuously received an exemption and does not refer to a refiner that has authorized its exemption to lapse. In the feeling of the RFA, this sort of a refiner had no exemption that can be prolonged.

The U.S. Courtroom of Appeals for the 10th Circuit agreed with the RFA’s interpretation of “extension” and held that the EPA decisions to grant the extensions have been invalid simply because the 3 refiners had no exemptions that the EPA could “extend.” In an feeling by Justice Neil Gorsuch, a bulk of the Supreme Courtroom disagreed with the 10th Circuit and held that a refiner that has authorized its prior exemption to lapse can apply for and get an “extension” of its exemption.

The bulk commenced by noting that the statute does not comprise a definition of “extension.” The bulk concluded that, while “extension” could bear more than a person this means, its “ordinary” this means incorporates the problem in which an applicant has authorized its prior exemption to lapse. The bulk referred to a lot of sources to aid its summary, like dictionary definitions, utilization of the expression in other statutes, utilization of the expression in regular dialogue, and the construction of the statute in which the expression appears.

The bulk regarded that, in some contexts, Congress may well use the expression to refer only to an extension of an exemption that has been continuously in effect. The bulk concluded, on the other hand, that there was no explanation to imagine that Congress meant the expression to have any this means other than its “ordinary” this means in this context. The bulk recommended that Congress could have extra qualifying language to give the expression the more restrictive this means urged by the RFA, but Congress did not do so. ,

The bulk explained arguments that the RFA manufactured in which it urged the court docket to undertake its desired interpretation simply because that interpretation furthered some objective that the RFA attributed to Congress. The bulk declined to contemplate those people arguments simply because it could only speculate about the explanations why Congress may well have made use of the expression to even further a person of a number of plausible alternative functions where Congress did not point out the objective of the electric power to lengthen the exemption.

Eventually, the bulk noted that it had not conferred Chevron deference on the EPA’s interpretation of the statute simply because the government had not questioned it to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett dissented in an feeling joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The dissenting justices argued that, while the bulk attributed to Congress a this means of “extension” that is “possible,” it did not give the expression its “ordinary this means.” In the view of the dissenting justices, the “ordinary meaning” of “extension” excludes a agency that has authorized its prior exemption to lapse.

In other respects, the dissenting feeling is identical to the bulk feeling. It supported its version of the regular this means of the expression with a mixture of dictionary definitions, utilization in other statutes, utilization in regular dialogue, and the construction of the statute in which the expression appears. Like the bulk, the dissent regarded that Congress may well use the expression to have the broader this means the bulk characteristics to it in some contexts, but the dissent found no evidence that Congress meant it to have any this means except its “ordinary meaning” in this context. Like the bulk, the dissent refused to contemplate arguments based mostly on promises that Congress meant to use the expression to even further a certain objective simply because it was not ready to speculate about the objective of the electric power to lengthen the exemption.

I draw seven inferences from the thoughts in this case. Very first, the court docket starts its search for the this means of a expression made use of in a statute by hunting for a definition of the expression in the statute. Next, absent a statutory definition of the expression, the court docket seems for the “ordinary meaning” of the expression. 3rd, the court docket seems for evidence of the “ordinary meaning” of the expression in dictionaries, utilization in other statutes and utilization in regular dialogue. Fourth, the court docket is ready to contemplate the construction of the statute in which the expression is made use of and the context in which it is made use of if but only if there is persuasive evidence that Congress made use of the expression to have a this means that differs from its regular this means. Fifth, the court docket is ready to contemplate arguments based mostly on the alleged objective for which Congress made use of a expression if but only if there is persuasive evidence that Congress made use of the expression for that objective. Sixth, the tendency to defer to company interpretations of ambiguous language in company-administered statutes that achieved its apogee in 1984 when the Courtroom issued its well-known Chevron feeling has declined considerably. And seventh, labeling justices as conservative Republicans or liberal Democrats is not valuable in a lot of cases. In this case, the bulk consisted of five justices generally seen as conservative (Gorsuch along with Main Justice John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh) and a person justice generally seen as liberal (Justice Stephen Breyer). The dissent consisted of a person conservative (Barrett) joined by two liberals (Sotomayor and Kagan).

The post In dispute about renewable fuels, justices unravel “extensions” of “exemptions” appeared very first on SCOTUSblog.